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INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky "architect's no-action statute," limiting claims
against the design and building professions,' has served as a
blueprint for professional uncertainty since its enactment in 1966.
After almost ten years of being considered unconstitutional,
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 413.135 was resurrected
by several court decisions in the early 1980s. 3 Yet, less than two
years after Kentucky courts began to apply the reinstated statute,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Wallace v. Tabler4 again
I Kentucky Revised Statute § 413.135 provides in part:
Actions for damages arising out of injury resulting from construction of
improvement to real estate.-(l) No action to recover damages, whether
based upon contract or sounding in tort, resulting from or arising out of
any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, inspection or construc-
tion of any improvement to real property, or for any injury to property,
either real or personal, arising out of such deficiency, or for injury to the
person or for wrongful death arising out of any such deficiency, shall be
brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision, inspection or construction of any such improvement after the
expiration of five (5) years following the substantial completion of such
improvement.
KY. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 413.135 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 The Kentucky Court of Appeals invalidated the statute in Saylor v. Hall, 497
S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973).
See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 672 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. 1984); Carney v.
Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1982); Ball Homes v. Volpert, 633 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1982);
Housing Now-Village West v. Cox & Crawley, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 350 (Ky. Ct. App.
1982).
, No. 83-CA-2160-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1984), aff'd, No. 84-SC-844-DG
(Ky. Nov. 21, 1985).
EDITORS NOTE: At press time the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the
Kentucky Court of Appeals decision of Wallace v. Tabler. The Supreme Court, however,
declared KRS 413.135 unconstitutional on state grounds and did not reach the federal
question. See No. 84-SC-844-DG, slip op. at 8.
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declared the no-action statute invalid.5 The constitutionality of
similar statutes has been challenged in at least thirty-one juris-
dictions with rather inconsistent results, 6 so Kentucky does not
stand alone amid this cloud of confusion.
The availability, or lack thereof, of this statute alters the
number of claims brought by injured parties for damages based
on either contract or tort theory. It also affects the types of
defenses advanced by architects, engineers, contractors, builders
and others in the construction industry. This Comment will
examine the statute's background and its current status after
Wallace v. Tabler. This Comment will also discuss the probable
handling of the statute by the Kentucky Supreme Court on
I Id., slip op. at 8.
6 The following decisions have upheld the validity of similar statutes: Adair v.
Koppers Co., 541 F. Supp. 1120, 1128-30 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Smith v. Allen-Bradley
Co., 371 F. Supp. 698, 701 (N.D.S. 1974); Carter v. Hartenstein, 455 S.W.2d 918 (Ark.
1970), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 401 U.S. 901 (1971);
Salinero v. Pon, 177 Cal. Rptr. 204, 206-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); 646 S.W.2d at 40;
Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2 of the Parish of St. Charles, 366 So. 2d
1381 (La. 1978); Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 518-25 (Mass. 1982); O'Brien v.
Hazelet & Erdal, 299 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 1980); Anderson v. Fred Wagner and Roy
Anderson, Jr., Inc., 402 So. 2d 320 (Miss. 1981); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 551 P.2d
647, 650-52 (Mont. 1'976); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 293 A.2d 662, 666-68
(N.J. 1972); Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868, 876-83 (N.C. 1983);
Howell v. Burk, 568 P.2d 214, 217-21 (N.M. Ct. App.) cert. denied, 569 P.2d 413 (N.M.
1977); Josephs v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203, 207-08 (Or. 1971); Freezer Storage, Inc. v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 341 A.2d 184 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 382 A.2d 715 (Pa.
1978); Harmon v. Angus R. Jessup Assocs., Inc., 619 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1981); Ellerbe
v. Otis Elevator Co., 618 S.W.2d 870, 873-74 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), appeal dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question, 459 U.S. 802 (1982); Good v. Christensen,
527 P.2d 223, 225 (Utah 1974); Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating
& Plumbing Co., 503 P.2d 108, 111 (Wash. 1972); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. E.D.
Wisley Co., 301 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980), modified on other grounds,
313 N.W.2d 223 (Wis. 1982).
Statutes were held to be unconstitutional in the following decisions: McClanahan
v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334, 1344-46 (D. Colo. 1980); Bagby Elevator
and Elec. Co. v. McBride, 291 So. 2d 306 (Ala. 1974); Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons,
369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 (Hawaii 1973); Skinner v.
Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (IIl. 1967); Wallace v. Tabler, No. 83-CA-2160-MR (Ky. Ct.
App. Sept. 7, 1984); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yeager, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548,
555 (Minn. 1977); Henderson Clay Prods., Inc. v. Edgar Wood & Assocs., Inc., 451
A.2d 174 (N.H. 1982); Loyal Order of Moose Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143
(Okla. 1977); Broome v. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 739 (S.C. 1978); Daugaard v. Baltic Coop.
Bldg. Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419, 424-27 (S.D. 1984); Kallas Millwork Corp. v.
Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 454 (Wis. 1975); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d
821 (Wyo. 1980).
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discretionary review7 and propose legislative measures that could
correct the invalidated statute's weaknesses.
I. AN HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE LIABILITY
OF DESIGNERS AND BUILDERS
From ancient Babylon8 through English common law9 to
early American jurisprudence,'0 society has imposed various types
of liability for the defective design or construction of buildings."
American courts applied the doctrine of contractual privity to
limit liability until the country's growing social conscience moved
into the courtroom in the early part of the twentieth century.'
2
See 32 KY. L. Summ., at 21 [hereinafter cited as KLS].
, In ancient Babylon, the law recognized the special relationship between a builder
and a person injured due to the builder's defective design or construction. This relation-
ship created obligations that were set out in the Code of Hammurabi. The law, in a
form of strict liability that required no proof of negligence or privity of contract,
imposed harsh punishment on the defendant. The Code required that:
If a builder [builds] a house for a man and [does] not make its
construction firm, and the house which he has built [collapses] and [causes]
the death of the owner of the house, that builder shall be put to death.
If it [causes] the death of a son of the owner of the house, they shall
put to death a son of the builder.
If it [the collapsing of the house] [destroys] property, he shall restore
whatever it destroyed, and ... he shall rebuild the house which collapsed
from his property [at his own expense].
If a builder [builds] a house for a man and does not make its
construction meet the requirements and a wall [falls] in, that builder shall
strengthen that wall at his own expense.
Note, Liability of Design Professionals-The Necessity of Fault, 58 IowA L. REv. 1221,
1221-22 (1972-73) (quoting R. HARPER, THE CODE OF HAMmuRAI §§ 229-233 (1904)).
As in ancient Babylon, English common law based liability on a "special
relationship," but restricted that relationship to those people who actually had contracted
with the architect or builder. Thus, privity of contract was a prerequisite for bringing a
claim; designers and builders were immune from liability to a person who may have
been able to prove the elements of negligence but were unable to establish the existence
of contractual privity with the defendant. Id. at 1222.
,o American jurisprudence, with roots in English common law, continued using
the privity doctrine to control the limits of liability until the landmark case of Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), which launched an assault on
the privity requirement. The MacPherson court imposed liability on an automobile
manufacturer despite lack of contractual privity with the ultimate purchaser. See 111
N.E. at 1054. See also Comment, Recent Statutory Developments Concerning the Lim-
itations of Actions Against Architects, Engineers, and Builders, 60 Ky. L.J. 462, 463
(1971-72).
See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d 455 (1980).
12 In MacPherson, the court "put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life
and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract
and nothing else." IlI N.E. at 1053.
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The privity requirement gradually lost its all-encompassing power
to bar third-party suits, 1' and in 1957 the veil of immunity was
lifted from architects and engineers.' 4 These professionals then
faced liability despite the lack of a legally recognized relationship
with the injured party. 5
With the widespread abandonment of fictional barriers to
lawsuits, architects and builders became liable,' 6 not only to a
broader group of injured third parties, but also for a potentially
longer period of time.17 The design professions did not accept
,1 Although the privity requirement lost some of its vitality, courts continued to
apply it. For example, Justice Cardozo refused to abolish the privity doctrine and barred
a third party from recovery for negligent misrepresentation by an accountant. See
Ultramares Corp. v. Touch, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931). His distinction between
foreseeability and unlimited liability allowed usage of the privity doctrine for many more
years. He wrote that "[i]f liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder
... may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeter-
minate time to an indeterminate class." Id. at 444. There are several reasons for the
longevity of the privity doctrine. Privity keeps intended contractual duties in check
without allowing an unintended extension of duty to third parties. It also guards against
unfair reliance by third parties on professional services for which they have not paid.
As a matter of public policy, "privity allows the court to limit the professional's liability
in recognition of the importance of his services to the public." Note, Liability of
Architects and Engineers to Third Parties: A New Approach, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW.
306, 312-13 (1977-78).
14 See Inman v. Binghampton Housing Auth., 143 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1957). The
Inman court extended the rule in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. to apply to the
determination of architects' or builders' liability. See 143 N.E.2d at 899.
,1 The privity rule was further eroded by extending design professionals' liability
to anyone who reasonably could be anticipated to use or enter a building. See Comment,
Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders-Blueprints for Non-action,
18 CATH. U.L. REv. 361, 362-63 (1968-69). See also Montijo v. Swift, 33 Cal. Rptr.
133, 135 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (architect's duty to exercise standard of ordinary care
extended to third party not in contractual privity with the architect); Laukkanen v. Jewel
Tea Co., 222 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966).
,6 Sources of professional liability claims include negligence in project design;
negligence in preparation of drawings or specifications; negligence from services per-
formed during the construction phase while acting as the owner's agent; improper use
of new materials or products; use of old products in a new manner without adequate
testing; noncompliance with governmental regulations, such as building codes, environ-
mental laws or occupational safety standards; alleged negligence in meeting demands to
complete projects more quickly than normal design and construction procedures might
allow; and changing attitudes of courts and society regarding the accountability of
professionals for their acts. See 4 OFFICE FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABTr RESEARCH, VICTOR
0. SCHINNERER & Co., THE LIABILITY OF DESIGN PROFESSIONALS, No. 6 p. 2 (1974).
17
Amenability to third party suits had wide ramifications for persons bur-
dened with the new liability .... As to the owner the architect's breach of
duty occurs when the defective structure is completed and accepted, and
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this swiftly developing trend toward seemingly unlimited liabilit
without resistance.' 8 Professional groups and their lobbyisl
pushed for adoption of model legislation 9 in statehouses acros
the country. 20 To replace protections lost with the demise of th
privity doctrine, they sought legislation that would limit liabilit,
through statutes of repose. 2' The model statute was ultimatell
enacted in a variety of forms, and the liability of architects
engineers and builders for defective design and construction once
again knew limits.Y In 1966 the Kentucky legislature followed
since the owner then has a cause of action, the limitation period may begin
to run. A third party, however, has no action against the negligent architect
until injury, which may occur many years after performance of services.
The statutory period in such a case would usually begin on the date of
injury, and the architect theoretically would be liable throughout his profes-
sional life and into retirement.
Comment, supra note is, at 363.
11 Three powerful professional organizations-the American Institute of Architects,
the National Society of Professional Engineers and Associated General Contractors-
mounted an offensive to curb the growing liability. Comment, supra note 10, at 464.
Not since the 1842 ruling in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, which
established the privity requirement, had architects been exposed to third-party suit. Id.
at 463.
,9 The text of the model statute, on which KRS § 413.135 was based, provides in
part:
Section 1. No action, whether in contract (oral or written, sealed or
unsealed), in tort or otherwise, to recover damages
(i) for any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision or obser-
vation of construction or construction of an improvement to real property
(ii) for injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such
deficiency, or
(iii) for injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any
such deficiency, shall be brought against any person performing or fur-
nishing the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction,
or construction of such an improvement more than four years after sub-
stantial completion of such an improvement.
Hearings on H.R. 6527, H.R. 6678 and H.R. 11544 Before Subcomm. No. I of the
House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 34 (1967).
m In two years, thirty jurisdictions enacted or amended statutes of limitations
specifically designed to protect architects, engineers, contractors, and in some states,
such as Kentucky, builders. Comment, supra note 10, at 464.
2, By 1983, 43 jurisdictions had existing limitations of actions pertinent to the
design and construction professions. OFmCE FOR PROFEssIoNAL LIABILITY REsEARcH,
VICTOR O. SCHINNERER & Co., A/E LEoAL NEWSLETTER, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT No. I
(1983).
22 The statutes typically bar causes of action after a specific time period, usually
from 4 to 12 years. The statutory period commences upon either completion or substan-
tial completion of the project. Many of the statutes differ in the membership of the
class to whom protection is extended. Some states restrict coverage to professional
1984-1985]
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this trend and enacted KRS 413.135, thereby cutting off liability
for architects, builders and engineers in tort and contract claims
brought more than five years after substantial completion of the
building project involved in the injury.23
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE KENTUCKY STATUTE
A. Early Challenges to the Statute
Three years after the enactment of KRS section 413.135, in
Lee v. Fister2 4 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
designers (architects and engineers) who are licensed by the state. See, e.g., Orno REv.
COD ANN. § 2305.131 (Page 1981). In contrast, other jurisdictions explicitly include
anyone who has been involved in any real estate improvement, such as surveyors,
architects, engineers and builders. See, e.g., WAsH. REv. CoDE § 4.16.300 (1983). Nearly
all exclude owners or persons in actual control of the premises from the statute's
protection, even if that person happens to be an architect or builder. Comment, supra
note 15, at 365. Much of the confusion concerning the application of these statutes is
because their form and operation differ from traditional statutes of limitation. One
commentator has noted that "statutes of limitation such as KRS 413.135 are in direct
opposition to general concepts of limitations of actions .... Comment, supra note 10,
at 468.
These statutes have also been termed statutes of repose, suggesting a slight differ-
ence in the method of operation from traditional limitations of actions. One author has
offered five definitions of statutes of repose: First, a statute of repose is identical to a
statute of limitation and the terms are interchangeable. Second, "statute of repose" is
a general term that includes statutes of limitations. A statute of repose promotes the
general policy of finality. It includes a number of specific statutory devices to accomplish
that purpose. Third, a statute of repose is merely a type of statute of limitation. It is
that part of the statute of limitation that puts an outside limit on liability. Fourth, the
difference in the two lies in when the statutory period commences. A statute of limitation
runs from accrual of a cause of action, traditionally at the time of injury. (See Caudill
v. Arnett, 481 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Ky. 1972)). A statute of repose, however, begins to run
at an artificial point unrelated to the time of injury, such as completion or substantial
completion of a building. Fifth, a statute of repose may be used in products liability
laws. Following a period of time, commonly referred to as "useful safe life," the
manufacturer may be relieved of liability. See McGovern, The Variety, Policy, and
Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am. U.L. Rav. 579, 582-
87 (1980-81).
The Kentucky Court of Appeals referred to KRS § 413.135 both as a "no-action
statute" and a "statute of repose." Wallace v. Tabler, No. 83-CA-2160-MR, slip op. at
3-4 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1984). The court seemed to favor the fourth definition given
here. See id. at 4-5. This Comment refers to such statutes as statutes of repose and no-
action statutes.
2' See note 1 supra for text of KRS § 413.135.
2' 413 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1969). The suit was against a model home builder for
injuries sustained by the plaintiff who had visited the home for inspection and fallen on
some loose paper. The plaintiff, who brought the action three years after the injury,
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relationship between the Kentucky statute and existing statutes
of limitation. Because the plaintiff had been injured three years
prior to bringing his claim, the federal district court dismissed
the action as being time barred by the general one-year statute
of limitations for personal injuries.2 In affirming the district
court's dismissal, the Sixth Circuit reconciled the one-year statute
of limitation for tort and contract claims with the five-year no-
action statute.2 6 To avoid extending the time in which to assert
damage claims, the one-year statute would continue to govern
claims for injuries occurring within the first five years following
substantial completion of an improvement to real estate. 27 How-
ever, after the five-year period expired, the no-action statute
barred all claims, regardless of the plaintiff's effort to bring the
claims within one year of the date of injury.28 The court ex-
plained that the legislature had intended to grant immunity to
builders and architects because negligent maintenance, not de-
fective design, would be the most likely cause of injuries occur-
ring after the five-year statutory period.29
The federal court's description of the legislature's intent was
of little utility when the Kentucky Court decided Saylor v. Hall3 0
argued that the more recent statutes (KRS § 413.135 enacted in 1966 and its precursor,
KRS § 413.120 which was enacted in 1964) should by implication repeal any prior
statutes of limitation. Plaintiff so argued in order to have his claim governed by the
five-year period found in KRS §§ 413.135 and 413.120. See 413 F.2d at 1287-88.
21 See 413 F.2d at 1288. KRS § 413.140 (Cum. Supp. 1984) states: "(1) The
following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action
accrued: (a) An action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff, or of her husband,
his wife, child, ward, apprentice or servant."
26 The court said:
[Diespite this apparent irreconcilable inconsistency in the two statutes, we
feel that the appellant's contention must fail. We note first that there are
no Kentucky cases on point. We must therefore attempt to determine how
a Kentucky court would interpret the statutes .... [Aipparent conflicts in
statutes on the same general subject matter should be reconciled whenever
possible... [and] repeal by implication is to be avoided whenever possible.
413 F.2d at 1289 (citing Brown v. Hoblitzell, 307 S.W.2d 739 (Ky. 1956)).
11 413 F.2d at 1289.
Is The court explained that no right of action exists for any injury, whether
personal or economic, sustained more than five years following completion "even though
the injured would otherwise have a full year within which to sue." Id.
- The court looked to policy reasons to explain the difference, concluding: "[Tlhis
piggyback limitation was intended as an added protection to builders, who might oth-
erwise be held liable for accidents resulting from delapidated conditions in deteriorating
structures, rather than as an extension to the rights of this particular class of injured
persons." Id.
- 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973).
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Disregarding the "pragmatic considerations" reflected in the
statute,3 and perhaps responding to the sympathetic facts of the
case,3 2 the Court held the statute violative of the state
constitution 3  because it abolished common law rights of action
for injuries and death caused by negligence. 34 The Court felt
strongly that KRS sections 413.135 and 413.120(14) should be
invalidated because they destroyed the plaintiff's cause of action
before it legally existed. 35 Furthermore, the Court held that a
constitutionally protected right of action-one that existed at the
time the statutes were enacted-could not be destroyed.
36
After Saylor, KRS 413.135 was considered unconstitutional
for almost ten years.3 7 The legislative intent to build in protec-
1' 435 F.2d at 1289. In Saylor the Court stated: "We are aware of the various
considerations of social policy that have been debated by the contending parties....
These pragmatic considerations, however, are not relevant to the confined holding made
in this opinion." 497 S.W.2d at 225.
32 A six-year-old boy had been crushed to death and his four-year-old brother
severely injured when a stone chimney and mantle fell inside their parents' rented home.
The structure had been built in 1955 by the defendant builder, who had sold the home
to its present owner/lessor. The Saylors, parents of the boys, sued the owner and the
builder within one year of the accident. The action against the builder had been barred
by application of KRS § 413.135 in Jefferson Circuit Court, but the court of appeals
reversed the judgment and remanded the case. See 497 S.W.2d at 225.
33
In our judgment KRS 413.120(14) and KRS 413.135 cannot be applied to
bar the plaintiff's claims in this action. Such application is constitutionally
impermissible because it would violate the spirit and language of Sections
14.54, and 241 of the constitution of Kentucky when read together.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 224.
See id. at 225.
16 Id. The Court's language is closely tied to another controversial but unrelated
ruling from 1973, viz. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113. Not only did the Court quote from
Justice Rehnquist's dissent on judicial restraint, but it also used terms that became
familiar during the Roe era to infuse more emotion into Saylor. The Saylor opinion,
based on a claim for the wrongful death of a child, unabashedly compared the statutory
denial of such a claim to the termination of a pregnancy. Cf. Ludwig v. Johnson, 49
S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932). In Ludwig the Kentucky automobile guest statute was struck
down as violative of the same state constitution provisions. In its ruling the Court said:
The [automobile guest-passenger] statute under consideration violates the
spirit of our Constitution as well as its letter found in sections 14, 54 and
241. It was the manifest purpose of the framers of that instrument to
preserve and perpetuate the common-law right of a citizen injured by the
negligent act of another to sue to recover damages for his injury.
49 S.W.2d at 351.
17 A look at the parties represented confirms the importance of this decision to a
broader audience than just legal circles. In addition to counsel for the appellant and
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tions from liability for the design and construction industries
was pushed aside.38 However, in 1982 the Kentucky Supreme
Court revived the issue by considering two cases challenging the
invalidity of the statute.
3 9
B. The Short-lived Reinstatement of KRS 413.135
Two 1982 cases effectively reinstated the repose statute in
Kentucky. In Ball Homes Inc. v. Volpert,4° the Court again
applied the Saylor test4' but found that the cause of action was
not one that existed when the statutes were enacted. In barring
the claim, the Court stated: "[T]he law of this state did not
provide a cause of action by the vendee of real estate against
the vendor on the basis of an implied warranty .... Hence there
is no constitutional impediment..... 42 Later in 1982, the Court
redefined the Saylor test and upheld the Kentucky no-action
statute as constitutional in Carney v. Moody.43 In Carney, the
appellee, the American Institute of Architects, National Society of Professional Engi-
neers, Consulting Engineers Council, Associated General Contractors of America, state
chapters of these organizations and the Homebuilders Association of Kentucky were
jointly represented by counsel. See 497 S.W.2d at 219.
31 The Saylor court distinguished Lee v. Fister by saying that the Sixth Circuit had
not considered state constitutional guarantees when ruling on the statute's application.
Kentucky's constitution, the Court said, contained built-in protections not found in
many state constitutions. The Saylor Court concluded: "[O]ur state constitution, how-
ever, has been held to prohibit the legislative branch from abolishing common-law rights
of action for injuries to the person caused by negligence or for death caused by
negligence." 497 S.W.2d at 222.
11 The cases of the early 1980s substantially reduced the precedential power of
Saylor, yet none expressly overruled it. See notes 40-51 infra and accompanying text.
" 633 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1982). In Ball Homes, the plaintiffs purchased a new home
from its builders in 1972 which was destroyed by fire in 1978. Plaintiffs claimed that
the loss of their property was caused by a defect in the wiring system. The trial court
dismissed the action as barred by KRS § 413.135. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
reversed on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional, relying on Saylor. The
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court and dismissed the claim
without expressly overruling Saylor. See 633 S.W.2d at 63.
41 The Saylor test is applied by determining whether there was a constitutionally
protected cause of action existing at the time of the statute's enactment. See Saylor v.
Hall, 497 S.W.2d at 224.
11 633 S.W.2d at 64. The doctrine of implied warranty, as applied to the profes-
sional builder who sells new homes, was adopted by the Kentucky Court in Crawley v.
Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969), three years after the enactment of KRS § 413.135.
It was a departure from the recognized rule of caveat emptor espoused in Osborne v.
Howard, 242 S.W. 852, 853 (Ky. 1922) and Fannon v. Carden, 240 S.W.2d 101, 103
(Ky. 1951).
1 646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1982).
1984-1985]
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Court, to some extent, validated arguments that had been sum-
marily rejected in Saylor.44
In Saylor, the Court had founded its ruling entirely on the
fact that injury or death due to negligence was a recognized
cause of action.4 As such, any claim based on the general term
"negligence" was protected by the state constitution. 46 Adopting
a narrower approach to the issue of protected causes of action
in Carney the Court held that the only constitutionally protected
rights were those that would have existed, not only when the
statute was enacted, but also when the state constitution was
adopted in 1891. Because the privity rule was then in place, no
remedy was allowed in 1891 for injured third parties against
negligent home builders. Thus, the Court concluded, the Ken-
tucky Constitution does not prevent limiting these causes of
action.48 The Court further explained that, simply because the
general concept of negligence existed in 1891, all claims resting
on any sort of negligence theory need not be constitutionally
protected .49
" The defendant-appellee in Saylor v. Hall argued that the statute did not destroy
a constitutionally protected cause of action because at the time the statutes were enacted
"there was no existing right of action for negligence in this state where the plaintiff was
a third party and the defendant was a builder whose work had been completed and
accepted by the owner with whom he had contracted." 497 S.W.2d at 223.
41 Id. at 225.
16 "[T]he legislature may not abolish an existing common-law right of action for
personal injuries or wrongful death caused by negligence." Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
4 See 646 S.W.2d at 41. The Court noted that in Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d
347 (Ky. 1932) the inquiry into possible violations of sections 14 and 54 of the Kentucky
Constitution was directed at whether the right of action was established prior to 1891.
This approach was once again taken in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Government Em-
ployees Ins., 635 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Ky. 1982). That ruling upheld the constitutionality
of the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act which limited a no-fault insurer's right of re-
coupment against a third-party tortfeasor. The Court held, in a foreshadowing of Carney,
that no right of recovery existed for such a claim when the state constitution was
adopted. Even had there been such a right in 1891, the right to indemnity would not
have fallen within the protection granted by sections 14 and 54. See 635 S.W.2d at 477.
11 See 646 S.W.2d at 41.
19 The Court stated:
This would mean ... that every enlargement in the field of liability for
negligent conduct, whether effected by statute or by decision of this court,
would assume constitutional status beyond the power of either court or
legislature to overrule or repeal it. We cannot accede to that proposition.
Id. As noted in Loyal Order of Moose Lodge 1735 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla.
1977), the legislature had exercised its power to abolish certain common-law causes of
action. The Oklahoma court pointed to certain heart balm causes of action such as
seduction and alienation of affection. See 563 P.2d at 146 n.12.
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Although not expressly overruling Saylor, Carney did mark
a return to an earlier test for constitutionality0 that permits
greater deferrence to the legislature.5 ' Unless the specific cause
of action was recognized in 1891, the legislature has the power
to create or abolish rights as it deems proper.
C. 1984 Decisions Leading to Invalidation
The Kentucky Supreme Court's answer to a certified question
from the federal district court 2 in In re Beverly Hills Fire
Litigation53 further clarified application of the statute 4 and pro-
vided precedent for the Kentucky Court of Appeals' invalidation
of the no-action statute in Wallace v. Tabler.51 The claims in
Beverly Hills stemmed from deaths and injuries sustained in the
1977 Beverly Hills Supper Club fire. The plaintiffs brought suit
in federal district court against the manufacturers of the "old
technology" aluminum wiring that allegedly had caused the fire. 6
The manufacturers claimed immunity under the Kentucky no-
See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
Our construction of these constitutional provisions is and should be that
which leaves to the policy-making arm of government the broadest discre-
tion consistent with their language. That the statutes limiting the period of
a builder's exposure to liability for faulty construction may occasionally
leave injured parties without a remedy, or without.a solvent defendant,
cannot justify the courts taking corrective measures that more appropriately
fall within the prerogative of the legislature.
646 S.W.2d at 41 (emphasis added).
,2 See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 672 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. 1984).
See 583 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Ky. 1984).
' The Kentucky Court ruled on the issue of whether material suppliers were
included in the statute's immunity. The question was certified by the federal district
court, pursuant to Ky. R. Crv. P. 76.37(1) (1984) which was amended to allow district
courts to certify questions of law on which there is no controlling state precedent. See
583 F. Supp. at 1165.
No. 83-CA-2160-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1984).
'6 The original claims were brought as a class action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. A general judgment was entered for the
defendant wire manufacturers and plaintiffs appealed. An appeal was granted because
of impermissible jury conduct. In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted
that it was unsure of the status of KRS § 413.135 and Saylor as precedent. The defendants
had cross-appealed on the ground that the lower court erred in denying their motion to
dismiss the claims on the basis that the action was barred by KRS § 413.135. See In re
Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207, 223-27 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S.Ct. 2090 (1983).
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action statute, reasoning that they had "designed" component
parts for an earlier renovation at the club.57
Although In re Beverly Hills was essentially a products lia-
bility claim5s governed by another Kentucky statute,5 9 the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court nevertheless addressed the applicability of
KRS section 413.135 to manufacturers and material suppliers.
Holding that express language is required for coverage by the
statute, the Court found that Kentucky's no-action statute pro-
tects neither "materialmen, nor... construction projects unless
they are an 'improvement to real property.' )760
While the Court tried to construe the statute in the manner
most favoring constitutionality, ' both inclusion and exclusion
of material suppliers seemed to create no-win situations. To
include material suppliers would risk violation of section 59 of
the state constitution which prohibits special legislation.62 Inclu-
sion also would unreasonably favor manufacturers of products
to be used in construction over manufacturers of the same
products which conceivably could have uses outside the building
industry.6 3 However, the express exclusion of material suppliers
opened the statute to attack on equal protection grounds, based
See 695 F.2d at 224.
See 672 S.W.2d at 923.
KRS § 411.300(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982) provides: "[A] 'product liability action'
shall include any action brought for or on account of personal injury, death or property
damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formulation,
development of standards, preparation, processing, assembly, testing, listing, certifying,
warning, instructing, marketing, advertising, packaging or labeling of any product."
60 See 672 S.W.2d at 925.
61 See id. The Court felt "motivated in part b' [its] duty to render the acts of the
legislature viable by interpreting such acts consistent with constitutional mandates, and
to avoid construction that 'threatens unconstitutionality,' wherever reasonably possible."
Id. (quoting George v. Scent, 346 S.W.2d 784, 790 (Ky. 1961)).
Ky. CONST. § 59 provides: "Local and special legislation.-The General Assem-
bly shall not pass local or special acts concerning any of the following subjects, or for
any of the following purposes, namely: ... Fifth: To regulate the limitation of civil or
criminal causes."
"Special acts," as used above, has been defined by the Kentucky Supreme Court
as "legislation which arbitrarily or beyond reasonable justification discriminates against
some person or objects and favors others." City of Louisville v. Klusmeyer, 324 S.W.2d
831, 834 (Ky. 1959). See also King v. Commonwealth, 238 S.W. 373, 376 (Ky. 1922)
(defining special legislation as such that relates to "particular persons, places, or things"
or to persons, places or things "separated by any method of selection from the whole
class").
61 672 S.W.2d at 926.
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on the lack of protection for suppliers whose risks are substan-
tially no different than those faced by architects and engineers.
As the Court admitted, it did not address "the underlying ques-
tion of constitutionality of KRS 413.135 as to those persons who
are within its purview.'' 64
Equal protection proved to be the argument that toppled the
statute in Wallace v. Tabler.6 5 For reasons quite different than
those discussed in Saylor v. Hall,6 6 the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals declared the statute unconstitutional. The ruling was handed
down less than three months after the express exclusion of
material suppliers from the statute's protection.
III. THE SUCCEssJL EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
Challenges to similar statutes in other jurisdictions have been
aimed at equal protection, due process or special legislation
violations.67 Equal protection attacks, often joined with due
process arguments 6 are usually based on one of two grounds.
m Id.
65 No. 83-CA-2160-MR.
6 497 S.W.2d 218. The decision in Saylor was premised upon the common law
right of action for injuries. See notes 30-39 supra and accompanying text.
67 Due process challenges alone have not been successful in overturning any statutes
of repose. The due process argument is sometimes discussed simultaneously with equal
protection or special legislation. McGovern, supra note 22, at 613. See also Rosenberg
v. Town of North Bergen, 293 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1972); Loyal Order of Moose Lodge 1785
v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977) (Statute did not deny due process, but violated
equal protection guarantee and was special legislation.).
63 The permissibility of a statute barring claims is supported by a long line of
United States Supreme Court decisions that have provided the guidelines often used by
state courts to determine the validity of statutes of repose. At the heart of these decisions
is the general rule that the United States Constitution does not forbid the creation of
new rights or the abolition of old ones. The Court in Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117
(1929), allowed a legislature to dismantle old rights recognized by common law as long
as the action furthered a reasonable legislative goal. The Court pointed out that it was
within the power of the legislature to draw lines that determine liability where it saw
fit. As long as the "statute strikes at the evil where it is felt and reaches the class of
cases where it most frequently occurs," the Court would uphold the statute. Id. at 124.
One could argue that the statute strikes at the "evil" of indefinite liability that
architects and builders face long after their work has been removed from their control.
The court in Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 293 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1972), explained
how a statute of repose might cut off liability without disturbing a vested right:
[The statute] does not bar a cause of action; its effect, rather is to prevent
what might otherwise be a cause of action from ever arising. Thus injury
occurring more than ten years after the negligent act allegedly responsible
for the harm forms no basis for recovery. The injured party literally has
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It is argued either that classification of the protected class was
irrational69 or that the policy reasons for making such classifi-
cations are not being fulfilled by a particular statute.70 If the
state has a constitutional provision prohibiting special legislation,
as does Kentucky, separate or simultaneous attacks can be
brought on those grounds.
7'
In equal protection challenges, 72 the legislative history of the
statute is crucial because of the nature of the traditional "ra-
no cause of action.... The function of the statute is thus rather to define
the substantive rights than to alter or modify a remedy.
Id. at 667.
See, e.g., Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 (Hawaii 1973). In Fujioka it was
contended that HAwAn REv. STAT. § 657-8 (1954) violated equal protection by estab-
lishing a 10-year statute of limitations on actions for damages based on "professional
services or licensed construction to improve real property." 514 P.2d at 569. Because of
that statute, the contractor and the engineer of a fallen roof would be immune from
liability, while the owner of the building would be totally responsible for the injuries
caused by the collapsed roof. Id. The Supreme Court of Hawaii stated:
It is clear that the classification does not rest upon some reasonable
consideration of differences . . . which have a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation. Nor is the classification founded upon
a reasonable distinction or difference necessitated by state policy. A statute
making such an unsupportable classification fails to meet the requirements
of the equal protection guaranty.
Id. at 571.
0 See McClanahan v. American Gilsonite & Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334, 1346 (D.
Colo. 1980); Loyal Order of Moose Lodge 1784 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d at 147. CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 13-80-127(l)(a) (Supp. 1984) provides that "[a]ll actions against any architect,
contractor, engineer, or inspector brought to recover damages for injury to person
or property caused by the design, planning, supervision, inspection, construction, or
observation of construction of any improvement to real property" were required to
be brought within 10 years of "substantial completion." In McClanahan v. American
Gilsonite Co. the court recognized the legislative concern for those classes of persons
protected by the statute. By forcing plaintiffs to bring actions within a "reasonable
time," the legislature hoped to avoid difficulties in proof which frequently arise from
the passage of time. 494 F. Supp. at 1345. The objective was achieved, the court
conceded, but was done in a discriminatory way, "raising the suspicion that those
who have sufficient political power or who can afford a persuasive lobbyist may achieve
immunity from accountability to the laws that govern others." Id. at 1346.
" See Skinner v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588, 590-91 (I1. 1967) (statute found
violative of equal protection and limitation of special laws).
72 Not all equal protection or due process challenges to such statutes of repose
in other states have been based on alleged violations of the United States Constitution.
Many utilize United States Supreme Court standards to test the statutes for possible
violation of state constitution provisions that mirror the federal equal protection or due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. See
notes 73-76 infra and accompanying text for discussion of Supreme Court standards for
equal protection. Kentucky's constitution contains a provision that specifically guarantees
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tional basis" test. 71 This two-pronged test requires that any
statutory classification 74 be rational-more specifically, that the
classification not have been enacted by the legislature for arbi-
trary or capricious reasons. 75 Also, there must be a reasonable
relationship between the statute and furtherance of a legitimate
legislative goal.
7 6
In Wallace v. Tabler 7 the Kentucky Court of Appeals in-
validated KRS section 413.135 because it found "no rational
equal protection. See Ky. CONST. § 3.
The validity of statutes like KRS § 413.135 has never been tested by the United
States Supreme Court. However, the Court impliedly approved an Arkansas decision
upholding the constitutionality of a statute similar to KRS § 413.135 by dismissing an
appeal of the decision "for want of a substantial federal question." See Carter v.
Hartenstein, 455 S.W.2d 918 (Ark. 1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971). Carter
is discussed at notes 100-04 infra and accompanying text.
The Arkansas statute is nearly identical to KRS § 413.135. The statute provides:
Personal injury or wrongful death-Four-year limitation.-No action in
tort or contract (whether oral or written, sealed or unsealed) to recover
damages for personal injury or wrongful death caused by any deficiency
in the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction or the
construction and repairing of any improvement to real property shall be
brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision or observation of construction or the construction and repair
of such improvement more than four (4) years after substantial completion
of same.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-238 (Supp. 1983).
Both the Kentucky and Arkansas statutes exclude material suppliers and owners
from the immunity granted by the statutes. The Arkansas statute has a four-year
statutory period, compared to Kentucky's five-year time limit. If the Kentucky Supreme
Court upholds the court of appeal's invalidation of the no-action statute, the United
States Supreme Court would possibly review the decision as a federal question erro-
neously decided by a state court.
" Economic regulations that neither interfere with a fundamental right nor dis-
criminate against a suspect class are analyzed for the existence of a rational basis to
justify such regulation. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 312 (1976) (mandatory retirement of state police officers at age 50 rationally related
to goal of assuring physical preparedness); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973) (excluding from food stamp program any household whose
members are not "all related to each other" found to be without any rational basis).
"' The equal protection guarantee does not deny a state the right to classify its
citizens with laws that will affect some groups differently than others. As long as the
classification rests on grounds reasonably related to achieving the state objective, "a
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any set of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
" See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533.
6 d. at 534.
No. 83-CA-2160-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1984). The claim was for the
wrongful death of plaintiff's husband who was killed while repairing an elevator at the
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basis to exclude materialmen, and controlling owners and tenants
from the immunity granted architects, engineers, and builders
by [the statute]. Concluding that there are no significant
differences between the groups protected by the statute and those
excluded from its protection, the court found the distinction to
be unreasonable. 79 Thus, the statute violated the state and federal
equal protection guarantees.80
The Kentucky court rejected the reasoning relied upon by
other jurisdictions which have upheld the validity of similar
statutes.8' In particular, the court disagreed with the distinction
between suppliers and builders that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court made in Freezer Storage Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co.
2
The Pennsylvania court based its validation of the state's no-
action statute on the existence of quality-control methods em-
ployed within most factories . 3 These procedures, the court noted,
allow manufacturers to test products before they are sold on the
market.84 The Kentucky Court of Appeals found this to be an
irrelevant distinction:
The high quality of control in the factory ends at the factory
gates. Once a material supplier's goods are taken to the site
and incorporated into the structure, the supplier is at the mercy
Harley Hotel in Lexington, Kentucky. The defendants-architect, elevator company and
hotel-were granted summary judgment pursuant to KRS § 413.135, the "architect's no-
action statute." See 83-CA-2160-MR, slip op. at 1-2.
18 See id. slip op. at 8.
79 See id.
-' The case was reviewed pursuant to the equal protection provisions of the state
and federal constitutions. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; KY. CoNsr. § 3.
Judge Howard dissented from the decision contending that "[tihis [equal protec-
tion] issue was never raised before the trial court, and under well-considered and long-
standing precedents, it cannot be considered for the first time on appeal." No. 83-CA-
2160-MR, slip op. at 11 (Howard, J., dissenting).
8 For a comprehensive list of cases upholding the validity of similar statutes, see
note 6 supra.
92 382 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1978).
See id. at 718-19.
Suppliers who typically provide items by the thousands, can easily maintain
high quality-control standards in the controlled environment of the factory.
A builder, on the other hand, can pre-test his designs and construction
only in limited ways-actual use in the years following construction is their
only real test. Further, every building is unique and far more complex than
any of its component parts.
Id. at 719.
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of those who construct, maintain and control the property.
Suppliers assume the exact risks of the protected class yet
receive no protection .... It is the identical nature of the risk
that the separate, but similarly situated, groups are exposed to
and not the conditions under which they work that is control-
ling.8
5
The court accepted the reasoning of a long line of cases
headed by Skinner v. Anderson . 6 Skinner, which invalidated the
Illinois statute, 7 was one of the first cases in which an architect's
no-action statute was declared unconstitutional. 8  The Illinois
court felt the statute singled out the architect and contractor for
special privileges that bore no reasonable relationship to the
legislative purpose. 89 The Kentucky court relied on the Skinner
court's language, 90 even though the Illinois case was based not
on equal protection but on a special legislation challenge. 9'
No. 83-CA-2160-MR, slip op. at 10 (emphasis added).
231 N.E.2d 588 (I11. 1967). The claim in Skinner was for damages resulting
from the plaintiff's personal injuries and the wrongful deaths of her husband and
daughter. The claim was against an architect who negligently designed a ventilation
system that allowed poisonous gases to escape into the decedents' residence. See id. at
589.
Skinner was also relied upon by the United States District Court in Colorado in
McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. at 1345-46. The court held
Colorado's statute to be invalid because it contravened the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause. See note 70 supra. See also Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D
Co., 225 N.W.2d 454 (Wis. 1975). The Wisconsin Supreme Court invalidated that state's
statute of repose for architects because of its exclusion of material suppliers. The
Wisconsin statute was later amended to include material suppliers within the statute's
immunity. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.155 (West Supp. 1977).
" ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 24(f) (Smith-Hurd 1966) (codified as amended at ILL.
CODE CIV. PROC. § 13-214 (West 1983)). The statute was later amended to include those
involved with the "observation or management" of the improvement and extends the
statutory period from 6 to 12 years.
' See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
The arbitrary quality of the statute clearly appears when we consider
that architects and contractors are not the only persons whose negligence
in the construction of a building or other improvement may cause damage
to property or injury to persons. If, for example, four years after a building
is completed a cornice should fall because the adhesive used was defective,
the manufacturer of the adhesive is granted no immunity. And so it is
with all others who furnish materials used in constructing the improvement.
But if the cornice fell because of defective design or construction for which
an architect or contractor was responsible, immunity is granted. It can not
be said that the one event is more likely than the other to occur within
four years after construction is completed.
231 N.E.2d at 591.
See No. 83-CA-2160-MR, slip op. at 10-11.
See 231 N.E.2d at 590.
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals pointed out a valid similarity
between architects and material suppliers that has not been so
succinctly defined by other courts. The analysis penetrated the
Freezer Storage rationale by first arguing that quality control is
a factor that differentiates suppliers from designers at the man-
ufacturing stage.92 But the Kentucky court concluded that the
determining factor is not the control they maintain at that stage
but the lack of control over the product once that product leaves
the factory. 93
The Kentucky Court of Appeals found that this lack of
control created precisely the same type of risk that architects
and engineers have faced-liability for injuries due to another
party's negligence. 94 Just as an architect's completed design may
be subjected to negligent maintenance by a third party owner, a
material supplier's product may be improperly installed or in-
corporated into a building. 5 This is a fine distinction that has
been explained more clearly by the Kentucky court than by most
other courts.
The significance of control to the Kentucky no-action statute
was first judicially recognized in Lee v. Fister.96 The Sixth Circuit
explained that the Kentucky legislature intended to protect build-
ing professionals because these professionals relinquish control
upon completion of the project. 97 The legislature wanted to cut
off liability from injuries due to "delapidated" and "deterio-
rating" conditions caused by the owner's negligence. 9 Although
the Wallace court recognized the legislative purpose in eventually
shifting the entire burden of liability to where it might properly
belong-the negligent owner or tenant-the court felt the pro-
tection provided by KRS 413.135 should not be limited to one
9 See No. 83-CA-2160-MR, slip op. at 10.
91 Id. See also text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
' See No. 83-CA-2160-MR, slip op. at 10. The court stated: "We fail to see any
rational basis for distinguishing [architects, engineers and contractors] from suppliers or
materialmen whose products, while uniform, are incorporated into unique structures,
thus becoming uniquely used and placed under the control of third-party owners and
tenants." Id.
95 Id.
- 413 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1969).
9, See id. See also notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text.
See 413 F.2d at 1289.
1160 [Vol. 73
ARCHITECT'S No-ACTION STATUTE
group when another experiences the same loss of control and
faces identical risks. 99
While the court's analysis is compelling and makes an af-
firmance by the Kentucky Supreme Court likely, there are per-
suasive cases from other jurisdictions that would support reversal
and a reinstatement of the statute.' °° For example, in Carter v.
Hartenstein,0' the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a similar
statute'02 was based on a rational distinction between the pro-
tected parties and those excluded from protection. 03 The Arkan-
sas court reasoned that "a vital distinction, nonetheless, exists
between owners or suppliers and those engaged in the professions
and occupations of design and building. This is not arbitrary or
unreasonable. It is a legitimate and practical exercise of the
legislative function."' 4
IV. REENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE
If the Kentucky Supreme Court affirms Wallace v. Tabler,'°5
the legislature has two choices: let the invalidated statute fade
See No. 83-CA-2160-MR, slip op. at 10.
'o See note 6 supra.
455 S.W.2d 918 (Ark. 1970). In Carter the plaintiff's son was killed in an
elevator accident. She sued the elevator company, architect and contractor who had
worked on the project. The suit was barred because the death had occurred after the
expiration of the four-year statutory period. The plaintiff appealed, claiming the statute
violated due process, contravened equal protection of the laws, and was local and special
legislation. See id. at 919-20.
1o, For a discussion of the similarities of the Arkansas and Kentucky statutes, see
note 72 supra.
,"I See 455 S.W.2d at 921. One suggested rationale for such classification is "the
problem of proof, and arguably the legislature could reasonably have concluded that
evidentiary problems facing the architect and contractor are greater than those facing
the materialmen." Comment, supra note 15, at 371.
The Carter court made a strong point of the rationale for excluding owners. It
reasoned that owners "are not in the same class as those described in the act. This is
particularly true after construction is substantially completed and accepted by the owners.
Part of acceptance is to accept some future responsibility for the condition of the
premises." 455 S.W.2d at 920 (emphasis in original).
For stronger language supporting the exclusion of material suppliers, see Reeves v.
Ille Electric Co., 551 P.2d 647, 653 (Mont. 1976) (manufacturer of whirlpool bath was
not part of the "construction team" but merely furnished an appliance installed in the
project); Howell v. Burk, 568 P.2d 214, 220 (N.M. 1977) ("[Mlanufacturer makes
standard goods and develops standard processes. Defects are harder to find in the
contractor's special jobs.") (quoting 2 HAm.'aR & JAMEs, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 18.5 at
1043 (1956)).
m 455 S.W.2d at 921.
,0, No. 83-CA-2160-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1984).
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into memory or reenact the statute with changes.'0 A reenact-
ment of KRS section 413.135 with changes could not only pro-
duce a statute capable of withstanding equal protection challenges
but it could also produce a statute fairer to injured parties and
more palatable to consumers generally. Since the Kentucky chal-
lenge was founded on the lack of protection for people who
share the same risks as architects and engineers, the simplest
means of enhancing the statute's constitutionality would be to
include those people in the protected class. 107
In reenacting the statute, the legislature could also refine the
law in a variety of ways. The Kentucky legislature could avoid
limiting claims for personal injury or wrongful death arising
from an improvement to real property.05 The statute could be
amended to only govern claims for damages to real or personal
property, so it would not delve into the emotional arena of
barring the claims of persons who have physically suffered from
a defective design or product.
The statute could also be modified to include a discovery
rule provision' that would toll the statute until injury is dis-
covered or reasonably should be discovered with due diligence." 0
The discovery rule has been accepted by several courts in recent
'0 Some states have reenacted amended no-action statutes to overcome the consti-
tutional infirmities that led to the original statute's being invalidated. See, e.g., ILL.
CODE CIrV. PROC. § 13-214 (West 1983) (12 years); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (vest
1984) (15 years); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 109 (West Supp. 1983) (10 years).
"I This route was taken by the Hawaii legislature after its no-action statute had
twice been invalidated. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-8 (Supp. 1983). The new Hawaii
statute not only includes suppliers and manufacturers within its protection, it also extends
the statutory period from 6 to 10 years. The statutory period begins to run upon
completion of an improvement to real property. See id.
,01 This approach was also taken with the Hawaii statute. See id.
,19 "This 'discovery rule' appears to be infectious and it has been spreading from
doctors to dentists, accountants, architects, lawyers, manufacturers of defective products,
and miscellany of negligence and other tort actions." PROSSER & KEETON, PROSSER &
KE TON ON TORTS, § 30; at 166-67 (5th ed. 1984).
"1 See Chrischilles v. Griswold, 150 N.W.2d 94 (Iowa 1967). The traditional ap-
proach is that the statute begins to run at the time of the architect's or builder's negligent
act, usually when the structure is designed or built. In more liberal jurisdictions, the
discovery rule has been applied when the statute is vague on commencement of the time
period. In Chrischilles, the court pointed out that the plaintiff homeowner could not
maintain a claim until he was aware of the injury to his interest. The commonly advanced
rationale for such statutes of limitation-to keep plaintiffs from sleeping on claims-is
not served if the plaintiff is unaware he has any injury. See id. at 100. See generally
Annot., 90 A.L.R.3d 507, 521-24 (1979).
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years"' because it makes statutes of repose seem less harsh and
unfair to plaintiffs whose claims are otherwise barred."12 Al-
though the Kentucky Court of Appeals has rejected application
of a discovery rule to the no-action statute, this decision was
based on the language of the statute itself."' 3 Consequently, a
statutory discovery rule should be enforceable.
Because the discovery rule leaves the defendant vulnerable
to claims indefinitely, it should be supplemented with an outer
time limit, after which all claims would be barred.' '4 This concept
is consistent with discovery rules now being used in Kentucky in
cases involving medical malpractice,' '5 products liability, ' 6
" See, e.g., City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corp., 599 F.2d 382, 389 (10th Cir. 1979)
("[W]e are of the view that the reasons for delayed accrual in actions for malpractice
apply as much to the engineering and architectural profession as to others."); Board of
Directors v. Regency Town Ventures, 635 P.2d 244, 248 (Hawaii App. 1981) ("The
statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have discovered that an actionable wrong has been committed.");
Sisters of Mercy of U. in U.S. v. Gaudreau, Inc., 423 A.2d 585, 588 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1980) ("[T]he Statute of Limitations may be likened to a time bomb, lying dormant.
When a claimant discovers or should have, with due diligence, discovered that he or she
has a cause of action . . ., at that moment the detonating device is triggered, and statute
begins to tick away."); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Osborn P1. & Htg., 225 N.W.2d 628,
632 (Wis. 1975) ("[T]he cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to
run when an injury occurs."); Barnes v. Town of Dayton, 474 P.2d 300, 303 (Wyo.
1970) (this view supports tendency in recent years "to increase the obligations and
liabilities of architects and engineers").
"I Prosser and Keeton have noted that the discovery rule has been implemented to
overcome the difficulties of the traditional approach. The literal, traditional approach
can sometimes bar a claim "before the plaintiff discovers that he has suffered injury,
and sometimes even before the plaintiff himself has suffered the injury." PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 109, § 30, at 165.
"I See Housing Now-Village West Inc. v. Cox & Crawley Inc., 646 S.W.2d 350,
351 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting the discovery rule because "the language in [KRS §
413.135] is controlling").
114 One of the suggested model statutes requires that all claims be brought within
two years of discovery, but under no circumstances can a claim be brought more than
six years after substantial completion. See Knapp & Lee, Application of Special Statutes
of Limitations Concerning Design and Construction, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351, 368
(1979). See also Comment, supra note 15, at 385-87.
"I Kentucky began applying the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases in
Tomlinson v. Siehl, 459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970). See also Hackworth v. Hart, 474
S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1971). The discovery rule has been statutorily imposed in medical
malpractice cases. See KRS § 413.140(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
"1 The discovery rule was adopted for use in products liability actions in Louisville
Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Products, 580 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky. 1979) (overruling
Columbus Mining Co. v. Walker, 271 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954)). The statute creating
liability for products manufacturers does not express an exact time for commencing the
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professional negligence" 7 and certain other actions." '8 An outer
time limit would provide greater equity for the injured potential
plaintiff and certainty for designers and builders that claims will
be barred after a specified time.
Alternatively or simultaneously, the Kentucky legislature
should extend the present five-year statutory period that follows
substantial completion. The modern trend in reenacting or
amending such statutes is to extend the period" 9 to increase the
chances that all meritorious claims will be addressed.' 20 An
extension' 21 would better balance the interest of injured parties
with the professional person's ability to acquire insurance' 22 to
cover extended, but not indefinite, liability.
CONCLUSION
No-action statutes, or statutes of repose that limit liability
for architects and builders, were enacted after the demise of the
privity doctrine. Not unlike most of the no-action statutes en-
statutory period. The Court decided "to extend the discovery rule of our medical
malpractice cases to tort injuries resulting from a latent disease caused by exposure to
a harmful substance." 580 S.W.2d at 499. See also KRS §§ 411.300-.340 (Cum. Supp.
1982).
The Court's action in adopting the discovery rule was consistent with other courts
which are hesitant to apply a discovery rule when there is a specific statute that mandates
another approach but are likely to adopt a discovery rule when the statute is vague. See
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 109, § 30, at 167.
,,7 The statute governing actions for professional service malpractice has a one-year
statutory period, to commence "from the date of the occurrence or from the date when
the cause of action was, or reasonably should have been, discovered by the party
injured." KRS § 413.245 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
,"8 Discovery rules have long been applied to worker's compensation claims and
actions based on fraud or mistake. Cooper, Kentucky Law Survey-Civil Procedure, 66
Ky. L.J. 531, 534-35 (1977-78).
119 See authorities cited supra note 106.
,20 One study shows that 99.6% of all claims are brought within 10 years of
completion. In contrast, only 89.7% are initiated within five years of completion, as
required by the Kentucky statute. See Comment, supra note 15, at 367.
"I Some states have extended the statutory period for latent defects while main-
taining a shorter time limit on patent defects. See CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 337.1(3)(b)
(West 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(3) (West 1982).
122 Insurance rates for professional designers are admittedly high, but not as high
as for some other professions. Professional liability insurance rates for architects and
engineers have increased 439% from 1962 to 1974, when liability was extended by the
fall of the privity doctrine. Compare, however, the 826% increase for surgeons during
that same period. 4 OFFICE FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY RESEARCH. VICTOR 0. SCMN-
NERER & Co., THE LIABILrrY OF DESIGN PROFESSIONALS, VOL. No. 6 (1974).
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acted in the 1960s, KRS Section 413.135 has had a "checkered"
history. It was declared unconstitutional in 1973 in Saylor v.
Hall, reinstated in 1982 by Carney v. Moody, and again invali-
dated in 1984 in Wallace v. Tabler as violative of state and
federal equal protection guarantees.
The statute was invalidated because of the exclusion of ma-
terial suppliers, who were found to face the same types of risks
as those within the protected class. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals found that the statute arbitrarily distinguished between
groups of persons involved in the construction industry who
basically face identical risks.
If the Kentucky Supreme Court upholds Wallace v. Tabler,
the legislature may reenact the statute with modifications. In
addition to broadening the protected class to avoid equal pro-
tection challenges, the legislature should consider other amend-
ments to the no-action statute. Lengthening the statutory period,
adopting a discovery rule with an outer time limit, and exempting
personal injury claims from the statute would make the statute
both fairer and more effective.
Jayne Moore
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